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013.02.0Abstract The integrated modular avionics (IMA) architecture is an open standard in avionics
industry, in which the number of functionalities implemented by software is greater than ever
before. In the IMA architecture, the reliability of the avionics system is highly affected by the soft-
ware applications. In order to enhance the fault tolerance feature with regard to software applica-
tion failures, many industrial standards propose a layered health monitoring/fault management
(HM/FM) scheme to periodically check the health status of software application processes and
recover the malfunctioning software process whenever an error is located. In this paper, we make
an analytical study of the HM/FM system for avionics application software. We use the stochastic
Petri nets (SPN) to build a formal model of each component and present a method to combine the
components together to form a complete system model with respect to three interlayer query strat-
egies. We further investigate the effectiveness of these strategies in an illustrative system.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The integrated modular avionics (IMA) is an emerging trend
in the on-board avionics systems during past decades. It is pro-
posed to address the issue of reducing life cycle cost (LLC),ent of Computer Science and
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14improving the performance of on-board avionics, and facilitat-
ing software/hardware updates. Modern military and civil air-
crafts like F-22, F-35, Boeing 787 and A-380 are all equipped
with IMA systems.
Different from traditional federated avionics systems,
which focus on designing a dedicated system for each applica-
tion, IMA is a highly open system which supports various
kinds of avionic applications. The integration of avionics com-
ponents has the following advantages.1
(1) Optimized allocation of spare computing resources. Sys-
tem resources are maintained by the integrator, which
can dynamically adjust the resource occupied by each
component, adding more ﬂexibility to system resource
management.SAA & BUAA. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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sumption. Dedicated infrastructures are replaced with
a general IMA platform which contains a set of common
processors, memories, communication channels, etc.,
resulting in a great reduction of equipment weight and
power consumption.
(3) The standardized IMA architecture and interface are
widely accepted by the industry, facilitating the develop-
ment and migration of application.
A main characteristic of the IMA system is the ‘‘softwariza-
tion’’ of functional components. Software realization of func-
tional module can improve the resource utilization efﬁciency
and reduce the number of dedicated subsystems. According
to a recent report, the software implementation, which has
170 million lines of code and accounts for over 80% of all
functional components in the F-22 military ﬂight, has now
surged to 800 million lines in the F-35 military ﬂight. The
maintenance of the software stability and reliability is the crux
to the on-board system management.
Health monitoring/fault management (HM/FM) is intro-
duced in the IMA environment to ensure that the system can
still behave well in the presence of software faults.2 The health
monitoring module is responsible for identifying, locating, and
reporting the failure of one or more system elements. The fault
management module is then activated to take appropriate
behavior to conduct trouble-shooting works. Extensive re-
search efforts have contributed to the state-of-the-art HM/
FM techniques.3–5
Modern avionics systems generally adopt a layered archi-
tecture which provides the abstraction necessary to minimize
the effect of system changes on user application.6 IMA with
a layered architecture has been advocated by the industry.6,7
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no quantiﬁed
performance analysis of the HM/FMmodule in a layered IMA
environment. We believe this work is of great signiﬁcance in
the sense that it can provide useful information on how to de-
sign the HM/FM scheme as well as how to set system param-
eters to build a cost-effective system.
In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of the layered
HM/FM scheme in the IMA environment using stochastic Pet-
ri nets (SPN). Compared with traditional ‘‘lower level’’ model-
ing tools like Markov chains (MC) or queueing theory,
stochastic Petri nets has the following advantages:
(1) To build a comprehensive model of a complex system is
a difﬁcult task, and often results in a huge model which
is hard to understand and debug. By using SPN, we
could use a ‘‘divide and conquer’’ approach to model
the system, i.e., ﬁrst divide the system into several com-
ponents, and then establish the sub SPN models for each
component, and ﬁnally combine sub SPN models
together to create an integrated model.
(2) The way sub models are connected reﬂects the system
architecture and behavior, which can be easily
expressed by guard functions in the transitions and
arches connecting sub models (Such information is
usually hard to model using MC). We can then per-
form comparison studies of the impacts from various
architectures and behavior without major changes to
the original model.There are mainly three contributions in this paper, namely:
(1) We build a scalable SPN model for the layered HM/FM.
We present SPN sub models for each component sepa-
rately and propose three monitoring strategies. We give
the way to concatenate SPN sub models together to con-
struct a complete model which realizes three strategies.
The performance of HM/FM system may be affected
by two major factors. (a) Parameters conﬁguration, such
as the inter-monitoring time. (b) Time variant factors,
e.g., the performance of functional components
degrades with time and cannot be renovated. In our
SPN model, however, we regard the system as time-
invariant and overlook the time-variant factors.
(2) The state space of the Markov chain underlying the
complete SPN model grows exponentially with the num-
ber of monitored objects, which makes the model intrac-
table for practical systems. Therefore we use time scale
decomposition (TSD) technique to design a general
method to approximately solve our SPN model.
(3) We conduct a numerical analysis of an illustrative system,
which is a prototype system in Allied Standards Avionics
Architecture Council (ASAAC) standard of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).8 The results shed
light on the design of a cost-effective HM/FM scheme.
We show that in our illustrative system, the subordinate
layer query blocking time nearly coincides for the subor-
dinate layer query with subordinate layer FM activation
(SQSF) scheme and the Subordinate layer query with cur-
rent layer FM activation (SQCF) scheme. Further, the no
subordinate layer query (NSQ) scheme has the worst per-
formance, and the SQCF scheme is generally better than
the SQSF scheme.We ﬁnally discuss some designing prin-
ciples for a practical system.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief over-
view of the multilayer HM/FM system of our consideration;
Section 3 presents SPN sub models for each component, as
well as the method of combining sub models into a complete
model with regard to three inter layer query strategies; Sec-
tion 4 discusses the deﬁnition of performance metrics and
TSD technique to approximately solve the model; Section 5
conducts a detailed evaluation of the HM/FM system in an
illustrative system; Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Multilayer HM/FM system
2.1. System architecture
The overall layered HM/FM system architecture is shown in
Fig. 1. This system is running on a partitioned real-time oper-
ation system, typically hosted in an on-board hardware. The
health monitoring modules take charge of monitoring all ob-
jects periodically.
When an error is found, the health monitoring module will
notify a fault management module, which deals with the error.
(1) Health monitoring mechanism. The HM module moni-
tors the health status of objects in real time, which must
perform the following tasks. (a) Periodically check the
health status of objects by sending anARE_YOU_ALIVE
Fig. 1 System overview.
Fig. 2 SPN model for propagating errors (guard function on
transition Propagating_2 is # Off_1 = 1).
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ordinate layer by using an ARE_YOU_ALIVE message. (c)
Reply its health status to its immediate superordinate layer
HM when required by using an I_AM_ALIVE message.
(d) Notify the associated FM when an error is found.
(2) Fault management mechanism. The FM module tackles
errors encountered in the system, whose duties include
the following parts. (a) Accept repair requests from the
HM module. (b) Locate errors, and activate the error
handler to tackle the error. (c) If the repair process fails,
report it to its immediate superordinate layer HM.2.2. Three strategies
Standards in avionics community do not specify the details
about how a particular layer interacts with others, and it is
not clear how much reliability gain can interactions bring to
the system. In this paper, we develop three different basic strat-
egies to specify system behavior.
(1) No subordinate layer query. The current layer HM
module does not query the subordinate layer HM.
(2) Subordinate layer query with current layer FM activation.
The current layerHMmodule queries the subordinate layer
HM periodically, and activates the current layer FM mod-
ule to tackle the error when an error is found.
(3) Subordinate layer query with subordinate layer FM activa-
tion. The current layer HMmodule queries the subordinate
layer HM periodically, and activates the subordinate layer
FMmodule to tackle the error when an error is found.
In the system we assume the error handler can successfully
repair the malfunctioning object with some known probability
(which can be obtained through historical trace data), and the
higher layer FM can handle lower layer errors. The HM mod-
ule in the top layer can ﬁx any errors without a fail (or else the
whole system may corrupt).
3. System model
We present the SPN models for the system. The HMmodule and
FMmodule of a given layer are assumed as independent processes.
The FMmodule is in the ‘‘sleep’’ mode unless a HMmodule acti-
vates it. A brief introduction to SPN is given in the appendix.
3.1. Object sub model
3.1.1. A single object
A single object can be expressed by a two-state Petri net as
shown in the left part of Fig. 2, with a token in place Ondenoting this object is running, and a token in place Off denot-
ing the object encounters an error and stops working. The
transition Working is a timed transition, the delay of which
can be set as the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the object.
Once the object enters Off state, it cannot return to On state
automatically, unless an error handler performs a successful
repair, therefore we add a guard function to this transition
to indicate a successful repair. We will discuss the details of
this guard function in the following sections.
3.1.2. Objects with coupling faults
Faults of different objects may be coupled. We basically deﬁne
two types of coupling faults:
(a) AND/OR coupling. This kind of coupling often involves
objects from different layers. The higher layer object may
contain many lower layer objects, and the availability of
the higher layer object is affected by the availability of
those lower layer objects. This type of coupling faults
are usually characterized by AND/OR relationships.
For AND/OR type coupling, the Working transition of
a higher layer object model is an immediate transition,
meaning that the higher layer object will be unavailable
as soon as the AND/OR condition is satisﬁed (Fig. 3).
Similarly, the higher layer object will be available if the
malfunctioning coupling lower layer objects are ﬁxed.
(b) Propagating coupling. This kind of coupling often occurs
among objects from the same layer. The fault of an object
may propagate through many approaches to other
objects. For example, a misbehaving process can take
up all system resources, thus disrupt normal operations
of all other processes. We use a timed transition (to repre-
sent the propagation time) Propagating associated with a
guard function to express the propagating faults (Fig. 2).
Unlike the AND/OR coupling case, repair processes in
propagating coupling case are independent.
3.2. Health monitoring sub model
The SPN model of a HM module is given in Fig. 4. The model
is divided into three parts.
3.2.1. Current layer query (CQ)
The HM module periodically checks objects belonging to its
layer. We use an exponential timed transition to denote the
timer since ordinary SPN does not allow timed transitions with
general distribution. What’s more, our focus is to evaluate the
Fig. 3 SPN model for AND/OR coupling errors (guard function on transition Working_hi is (#Off_1 = 1 Off_2 = 1) #Off_3 = 1).
Fig. 4 SPN model for health monitoring module.
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does not affect our analysis. The HM module checks the state
of current layer objects (timed transition Query_C), and re-
turns to state Idle if no error is found (immediate transition
No_Error_C). However, if there is an error, the HM module
will activate the FM module (timed transition Activate_FM1
and output arch 3 which points to a error handler determined
by query strategies speciﬁed in Section 2.2) while it still returns
to the Idle state (immediate transition Return2). The HM mod-
ule can also receive error reports from the FM module of the
subordinate layer (input arch 4). If the HM module is in state
Idle, transition Sub_Report is enabled. The ﬁre of Sub_Report
may induce the activation of the current layer FM module.
3.2.2. Subordinate layer query (SQ)
Note that this part only appears in the SQSF strategy and the
SQCF strategy. Transition Timer_S denotes the timer for sub-
ordinate layer query. The HM initiates a query (transition
Query_S) to its subordinate layer (output arch 5), and waits
for the answers. When the answers return (input arch 6), tran-
sition Replied will ﬁre. The system will return to Idle state if noerror is found (immediate transition No_Error_S), otherwise it
returns to Idle state (transition Return2) with activating the
FM module (timed transition Activate_FM2). The destination
place of output arch 7 depends upon the strategy employed:
for the SQSF strategy, it points to the FM module in the sub-
ordinate layer; for the SQCF strategy, it points to the FM
module in the current layer.3.2.3. Reply (RP)
The HM module receives query requests from superordinate
layer (input arch 1), collects the health status information
(timed transition Collecting), and sends the information back
to the HM of the superordinate layer (timed transition Reply
and output arch 2).3.3. Fault management sub model
The SPN model of the fault management module is shown in
Fig. 5, which consists of several error handlers (EH) and an er-
ror report pool.
Fig. 5 SPN model for fault management module.
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charge of repairing some speciﬁc objects. Inside the dashed
rectangle is the ﬁrst error handler. It accepts FM activation re-
quests (input arch 1) from a HM module. The EH ﬁrst checks
whether the object under its duty is in the state On. If so, it will
bypass the repairing procedure (immediate transition No_Er-
ror) and step into the next EH (immediate transition
Next_Handler). Otherwise, it will try to repair the malfunction-
ing object (timed transition Fixing). If the repair procedure is
successful, transition Success will ﬁre. If not, transition Failed
will ﬁre, bringing the FM to the next EH with an error message
sent to the error report pool. The error report pool collects er-
ror reports from all EHs (input archs 2), and notiﬁes the super-
ordinate layer HM (output arch 3, which is connected to the
input arch 4 in Fig. 4). The superordinate layer HM will acti-
vate the FM in its layer to treat this untractable error.
3.4. Combination of sub models
We show how to combine sub models together to form a com-
plete model. The individual HM and FM models can be ab-
stracted into a node, and directed arches between nodes
denote their relationships. Three combinations corresponding
to the three strategies mentioned in Section 2.2 are shown in
Fig. 6.
(1) Fig. 6(a) is the basic NSQ scheme, in which the HM only
focuses on monitoring objects in its current layer. The
HM will activate current layer FM when either of these(a) Basic NSQ scheme           (b) Enhanced SQ
Fig. 6 Combinationevents occur: (a) an object error is found in the current
layer; (b) a report returned by its immediate subordinate
layer FM saying that it cannot tackle the error.
(2) Fig. 6(b) is an enhanced SQSF scheme. Apart from the
basic scheme, the HM will periodically query its imme-
diate subordinate layer HM for its health information,
and activate the current layer FM when an subordinate
layer object error is found. The superordinate FM can
successfully ﬁx the error with a higher probability com-
pared with the subordinate layer FM, but will take
longer time.
(3) Fig. 6(c) is another enhanced SQCF scheme. It queries
the same subordinate layer HM as in Fig. 6(b), but acti-
vates the subordinate layer FM.
4. Performance analysis of the SPN model
4.1. Performance metrics
In this paper we conduct performability analysis of an avionics
system speciﬁed by the ASSAC standard. The performability is
deﬁned as a composite measure of a system’s performance and
its dependability. We mainly consider two kinds of perfor-
mance metrics.
4.1.1. Object availability
The availability is deﬁned as the probability that a given sys-
tem object is in the well-functioning state at an arbitrary time
point. The availability is a key metric for avionics system, since
a glitch of the onboard hardware/software may induce big
trouble to the ﬂights, e.g., an air crash. In our model, object
availability is affected by many parameters, such as system
state query timer, inter process/layer communication delay, er-
ror handling time, etc. The system design can also have signif-
icant impact. For example, whether to adopt the subordinate
layer query strategy or not? Which fault management module
should be activated upon receiving an error report from the
subordinate layer FM? We will investigate these design princi-
ples in the following sections.SF scheme        (c) Enhanced SQCF scheme
s of sub models.
Fig. 7 Three-layer avionics HM/FM system.
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The HM/FM module performs many tasks. One issue is that,
how fast can the system ﬁnish a task or react to a given event?
Many of these tasks, like the subordinate layer query/reply or
the subordinate layer error handling, involve inter-process/
layer communication, which complicates the queueing analy-
sis. We will show how to use our SPN model to analyze the
system.
In some situations, to maximize the object availability while
minimizing system response time is a contradiction. For exam-
ple, although the superordinate layer error handlermay success-
fully repair the malfunctioning object with higher probability
compared with the current layer one, it will take longer time,
or in other words, more CPU cycles, to complete the repair task.How to make a tradeoff between the object availability and the
system performance is also an important issue.
4.2. An approximate solution: time scale decomposition
The number of states of the continuous time Markov chain
(CTMC) under the stochastic Petri nets model grows exponen-
tially with the monitored objects. Here we present a TSD
method9,10 to obtain an approximate solution to the original
model. TSD can be used when the ﬁring delay of a SPN model
varies dramatically. This situation is prevalent in the depend-
ability analysis orientated model.
The general step to make a time scale decomposition of a
SPN model can be summarized as follows:
Table 1 Guard functions.
Transition Guard Transition Guard
Working_t #Oﬀ_m_1 = 1 and #Oﬀ_m_2 = 1 No_Error_C_t #Oﬀ_t = 0
Repairing_t #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0 or #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0 Error_C_t #Oﬀ_t = 1
Working_m_1 #Oﬀ_b_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_b_2 = 1 Return1_t #P8 + #P9 = 1
Repairing_m_1 #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0 No_Error_S_t #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0
Propagating_m_2 #Oﬀ_b_1 = 1 Error_S_t #Oﬀ_m_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_m_2 = 1
Repairing_m_2 #P9 = 1 or #P25 = 1 Return2_t #P20 + #P21 + #P22 + #P23 + #P24 + #P25 = 1
Repairing_b_1 #P9 = 1 or #P25 = 1 or #P34 = 1 No_Error_C_m #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0
Repairing_b_2 #P9 = 1 or #P25 = 1 or #P37 = 1 Error_C_m #Oﬀ_m_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_m_2 = 1
Quit_FM_t #Oﬀ_t = 0 and #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0
and #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0 and #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0
and #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0
Return1_m #P20 + #P21 + #P22 + #P23 + #P24 + #P25 = 1
No_Error_m_1 #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0 No_Error_S_m #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0
Next_Handler_m #Oﬀ_m_1 = 0 Error_S_m #Oﬀ_b_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_b_2 = 1
No_Error_m_2 #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0 No_Error_S_m #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0
Quit_FM_m #Oﬀ_m_2 = 0 Error_S_m #Oﬀ_b_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_b_2 = 1
No_Error_b_1 #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 Return2_m #P32 + #P33 + #P34 + #P35 + #P36 + #P37 = 1
Next_Handler_b #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 No_Error_C_b #Oﬀ_b_1 = 0 and #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0
No_Error_b_2 #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0 Error_C_b #Oﬀ_b_1 = 1 or #Oﬀ_b_2 = 1
Quit_FM_b #Oﬀ_b_2 = 0 Return1_b #P32 + #P33 + #P34 + #P35 + #P36 + #P37 = 1
Table 2 Initial parameter settings.
(a) Timed transitions
Transition Delay Transition Delay Transition Delay
Timer_C_t 100 Sub_Report_m 1 Reply_b 1
Query_C_t 1 Timer_S_m 50 Working_m_1 15,000
Activate_FM1_t 1 Activate_FM2_m 1 Propagating_m_1 200
Sub_Report_t 1 Collecting_m 1 Working_b_1 20,000
Timer_S_t 100 Reply_m 1 Working_b_2 20,000
Activate_FM2_t 1 Timer_C_b 20 Fixing_t 15
Timer_C_m 50 Query_C_b 1 Fixing_m_1 10
Query_C_m 1 Activate_FM1_b 1 Fixing_m_2 10
Actvate_FM1_m 1 Collecting_b 1 Fixing_b_1 5
Fixing_b_2 5
(b) Immediate transitions
Transition Weight Transition Weight
Success_m_1 0.9 Success_b_1 0.8
Failed_m_1 0.1 Failed_b_1 0.2
Success_m_2 0.9 Success_b_2 0.7
Failed_m_2 0.1 Failed_b_2 0.3
We suppose that the top layer error handler can successfully ﬁx any error with probability 1.
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Tf include fast timed transitions and immediate transi-
tions, and Ts include slow timed transitions. Tf[Ts = Tt.
(2) Suppose transitions in Ts cannot ﬁre. Delete those tran-
sitions in Ts, resulting in some separated fast SPN
subnets.
(3) Compress each fast subnet into a single place.
(4) The original marking in fast subnets determines the
number of tokens in the places in the compressed model.
(5) The ﬁring rate of the transitions in the compressed
model is determined by the stationary probabilities of
the local markings of fast subnets and the ﬁring rate
of the transitions in Ts.In our model, transition Repairing in the object sub model
is an immediate transition which synchronizes the repair pro-
cess. It can also be viewed as a ‘‘timed’’ transition, the ﬁring
rate of which depends upon the monitoring and repairing pro-
cess. The ﬁring delay can be viewed as the mean time to ﬁnd
and repair the bugs. To identify the ‘‘ﬁring delay’’ of immedi-
ate transition Repairing, we must ﬁgure out the factors which
affect the repair process.
For our HM/FM model, we could use the following steps
to compute the ﬁring delay in the compressed model:
(1) Since transitionWorking belongs to Ts, we consider that
it cannot ﬁre, e.g., the objects are always in the On state.
Then transitions Error_C, Return 1, Activate_FM1,
Fig. 8 HM sub model obtained from TSD.
Fig. 9 Compressed model.
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never ﬁre. We could approximately compute the stationary
probability that the HM is in RP, CQ, or SQ procedure.
(2) Identify the ﬁring delay of transition repairing for each
object. An object error can be discovered in two ways:
by its current layer HM or by its immediate superordi-
nate layer HM. Denote the probabilities of these two
approaches by pc and ps, and the ﬁxing time in these
two approaches by tc and ts. The ﬁring delay of transi-
tion Repairing can then be computed by tRepairing =
psts + pctc. When computing ts and tc, we suppose that
all other objects are in the On state.
For independent and propagating coupling objects, the fol-
lowing events may occur:
– The error is ﬁxed by current layer FM.
– The error cannot be ﬁxed by current layer HM but the
immediate superordinate layer FM.
– . . .
– The error is ﬁxed by the top layer FM.
These events are reasonable since FM turns to its immedi-
ate superordinate layer when ﬁnding an untractable error. tc
can then be computed as the expected value over these events.
The same technique can be applied for computing ts.
For AND/OR coupling objects, since the immediate transi-
tion Repairing only serves as a synchronization, we need not
compute their ﬁring time.
We then can use standard SPN analysis techniques to eval-
uate the system performance.
5. A case study
5.1. Illustrative system background
In this section we study a three-layered HM/FM system, which
is a prototype speciﬁed in ASSAC standard of NATO.8 The
basic system is the same as in Fig. 1. Layers from 1 to 3 are
named the aircraft (AC) layer, the integrated avionics (IA)
layer, and the resource element (RE) layer, respectively. The
SPN model with the SQSF strategy is shown in Fig. 7. The
AC layer has no RP part, and the RE layer has no SQ part.
Object in the AC layer has an ‘‘AND’’ coupling fault with 2
objects in the IA layer. Object 1 in the IA layer has an
‘‘OR’’ coupling fault with 2 objects in the RE layer. Object 2
in the IA layer has a propagating coupling fault with object
1 in the RE layer. Two objects in the RE layer are independent.
Guard functions are given in Table 1. The value of system
parameters are shown in Table 2. These parameters can be ob-
tained from various ways. For example, the probability for
successfully repair of a given error handler can be derived from
historical trace data, the query timer can be determined by sys-
tem design speciﬁcation, and inter layer/process communica-
tion delay can be measured when running the system in a
practical environment.
5.2. Solution
Using the TSD techniques, we ﬁrst get the decomposed HM
sub model as shown in Fig. 8, and the compressed model asshown in Fig. 9. From the decomposed HM sub model, we
compute some stationary state distribution from this model
which will help us to approximately derive ﬁring delay of tran-
sition Repairing in the compressed model.
5.2.1. Firing delay in bottom layer
We show how to approximately compute dRepair_b_1_c, i.e., the
ﬁring delay of transition Repair_b_1_c. dRepair_b_2_c can be ob-
tained following the same idea.
(a) IA subordinate layer (b) AC subordinate layer
Fig. 10 Subordinate layer query blocking time vs subordinate layer query timer.
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following paths:
(1) Path 1: The bottom layer HM discovers the error and
activates the bottom layer FM.
– Path 1.1: The bottom layer FM successfully ﬁxes the
error.
– Path 1.2: Following the path 1.1, the bottom layer
FM fails to ﬁx the error and reports it to the mid-
dle layer HM, which activates the middle layer FM
and successfully ﬁxes the error.
– Path 1.3: Following the path 1.2, the middle layer
FM still fails to ﬁx the error and reports it to the t-
op layer HM, which activates the top layer FM and
successfully ﬁxes the error.(2) Path 2: The middle layer HM discovers the error and
activates the bottom layer FM.
– Path 2.1: As in path 1.1, the bottom layer FM suc-
cessfully ﬁxes the error.
– Path 2.2: As in path 1.2, the middle layer FM success-
fully ﬁxes the error.
– Path 2.3: As in path 1.3, the top layer FM success-
fully ﬁxes the error.Then dRepair_b_1_c =
P
Pi · Ti, where Pi and Ti denote the
probability that the repair process follows path i and the time
spent in path i, respectively.
P11 ¼ PCQbWSuccess b 1; P12 ¼ PCQbWFailed b 1WSuccess m 2;
P13 ¼ PCQbWFailed b 1WFailed m 2
P21 ¼ PCQmWSuccess b 1; P22 ¼ PCQmWFailed b 1WSuccess m 2;
P23 ¼ PCQmWFailed b 1WFailed m 2
Ti is marking-dependent:
T1:1 ¼ dActivate FM1 bþ dFixing b 1; T2:1 ¼ dActivate FM2 mþ dFixing b 1
T1:2 ¼
T1:1þTmþ dFixing m 2; if Off m 1¼ 0
T1:1þTmþ dFixing m 1þ dFixing m 2; if Off m 1¼ 1

T2:2 ¼
T2:1þTmþ dFixing m 2; if Off m 1¼ 0
T2:1þTmþ dFixing m 1þ dFixing m 2; if Off m 1¼ 1

T1:3 ¼ T1:2þTtþ dFixing t; T2:3 ¼ T2:2þTtþ dFixing t
whereTm ¼ dSub Report m
Prð#Idle m ¼ 1Þ þ dActivate FM1 m and
Tt ¼ dSub Report t
Prð#Idle t ¼ 1Þ þ dActivate FM1 t:5.2.2. Firing delay in middle layer and top layer
The ﬁring delay of transition Repair_b_1_c in the middle layer
can be computed in the same way as dRepair_b_1_c, with the dif-
ference only being that the faults now can only be discovered
and repaired by the middle layer and top layer HM/FMs.
We do not need to modify transition Repair_t_1_c and Re-
pair_m_2_c since these objects are AND/OR coupling, in
which the repair process can be synchronized by guard
functions.
5.3. Analysis of results
First we give the performability metrics deﬁnition in the mid-
dle layer. Metrics in other layers can be deﬁned in the same
way.
5.3.1. Dependability metric
We focus on the object unavailability, which is the probability
that the object is in down state at any given time. It is deﬁned
as follows:
Prð#On m 1 ¼ 1Þ and Prð#On m 2 ¼ 1Þ
Ef#P17g  Prð#Idle m ¼ 1j#Error Report Pool b ¼ 0Þ  k
2
Timer S m
kTimer S m þ kTimer C m

þPrð#Idle m ¼ 1j#Error Report Pool b > 0Þ  k
2
Timer S m
kTimer S m þ kTimer C m þ kSub Report m

ð1Þ5.3.2. Performance metric
We consider the subordinate layer query waiting time, which is
the time spent by the upper layer HM while waiting for the re-
ply from the lower layer HM in the subordinate layer query
duty. The formal deﬁnition is given in Eq. (1), obtained based
on the little’s law.
We conduct groups of experiments in regard of our three
SPN models. There are some available software tools like
GreatSPN11 to automatically solve the compressed SPN model
(a) Object 1 (b) Object 2
(c) Object 3                             (d) Object 4
(e) Object 5
Fig. 11 Object unavailability vs. RE current layer timer.
372 J. Wan et al.in Fig. 9, although we use TimeNET. We analyze the effects of
parameter variation and different strategies on the system
dependability.
The change of the subordinate layer query blocking time
with the subordinate layer query timer is shown in Fig. 10.
In Figs. 11–13, we plot the object unavailability variation with
the RE, IA, and AC current layer query timer, respectively. In
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, we plot the object unavailability variation
with the IA and AC subordinate layer query timer, respec-
tively. From these ﬁgures, we can summarize some general re-
sults as follows:(a) There are only slight differences of the subordinate layer
query blocking time between the SQCF scheme and the
SQSF scheme.
(b) The NSQ scheme has the worst performance, and the
SQCF scheme is generally better than the SQSF
scheme. As we can see in Figs. 11(a), (b), (d), (e),
12(a), (c), and (d), the unavailability increasing rate
of NSQ scheme is much faster than the SQCF scheme
and the SQSF scheme, meaning that we would better
use the latter two schemes rather than the former one
in an environment where the timer is set to a rather
(a) Object 1 (b) Object 2
(c) Object 3 (d ) Object 4
(e) Object 5
Fig. 12 Object unavailability vs IA current layer timer.
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IA layer and object 1 in RE layer, on the other hand,
the SQSF scheme has better performance compared
with the SQCF scheme. However, their differences
are very small, especially for object 2 in IA layer
(the results almost coincide).
(c) The variation of the current layer timer in the lower
layer has trivial effects on upper layer objects, unless
upper layer objects have AND/OR fault coupling rela-tionships with lower layer objects (e.g., object 1 in IA
layer, which varies drastically with RE current layer
timer than object 2 in IA layer).
(d) The object unavailability generally grows as the current
layer query timer and the subordinate layer query timer
become larger. This is a quite intuitive observation, since
a small query timer discovers the object faults more
quickly. The exception is the case in Fig. 14(c), where
the unavailability of object 1 in the IA layer, which has
(a) Object 1 (b) Object 2
(c) Object 3 (d) Object 4
(
Fig. 13 Object unavailability vs. AC current layer timer.
374 J. Wan et al.propagating coupling faults with object 1 in RE layer,
drops as the IA subordinate layer timer increases. Unlike
object 2 in the IA layer, whose faults can be ﬁxed by RE
layer FM since it is an AND/OR coupling type, faults of
object 1 can only be ﬁxed by the current layer FM or the
superordinate layer FM. If the IA subordinate layer query
timer is very small, it may take more resource from the IA
layer HM module, thus the discovery of faults in the IA
layer object 1 may be delayed, compromising its
availability.6. Discussione) Object 5The above analysis suggests that the SQCF scheme seems to be
the best of our choice when designing the system, but is that a
general result? Our answer is No. The designing framework
should depend upon the practical environment. Our recom-
mendations are given in Table 3. Here we mainly consider
the system resource level and the interlayer communication
overhead as main environment factors. The higher the system
(a) Object 1 (b) Object 2
(c) Object 3      (d) Object 4
(e) Object 5
Fig. 14 Object unavailability vs. IA subordinate layer timer.
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erful CPU), the faster can the HM module perform a current
layer query task, indicating the current layer query can be
more frequent. Similarly, if the interlayer communication over-
head is small, the system can perform more subordinate layer
queries. We categorize these two factors into two levels, low
and high, and some schemes are recommended for each set-
ting. When current layer query timer is small, the SQCFscheme and the SQSF scheme yield limited gains in the object
availability. Without subordinate layer query and the corre-
sponding waiting time, the NSQ scheme reduces the overall
system overhead and eradicates the useless blocking time. In
our context where the assumption is upper layer, EHs are more
resource and time-consuming than the lower counterparts, we
suggest the SQSF strategy to save resources without remark-
able performance degradation.
(a) Object 1 (b) Object 2
(c) Object 3 (d) Object 4
(e) Object 5
Fig. 15 Object unavailability vs. AC subordinate layer timer.




SRL and ICO stand for system resource level and interlayer com-
munication overhead, respectively.
376 J. Wan et al.7. Conclusions
The IMA architecture is the future of the onboard avionics
system. In this paper we study a layered HM/FM system foronboard application software. Our contributions can be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) We use the SPN as the basic tool to model and evaluate
the effectiveness of various HM/FM schemes. SPN is a
widely used system modeling tool deeply rooted from
Petri Nets theory and Markov Chain theory. The graph-
ical representation of SPN makes the model intuitive
and easy to understand. The guard functions associated
with transitions can conveniently express coupling faults
and controlling policies. Sub models can be concate-
nated by directed arches to ﬂexibly reﬂect the way of
combination of the components.
Performability analysis of avionics system with multilayer HM/FM using stochastic Petri nets 377(2) The main problem with our SPN model is the so-called
‘‘the curses of dimensionality’’, i.e., the state space of the
underlying Markov chain grows exponentially with the
number of the monitored objects. To address problem,
we present a method to approximately solve the SPN
based on the TSD technique, which is an effective way
to treat reliability-oriented models.
(3) We conduct a detailed quantitative performability anal-
ysis of an illustrative system. Our results show that the
SQCF strategy is generally better than the NSQ and
SQSF strategies. We also give some advices on design
principles based on our numerical analysis.
The system we analyzed is assumed to be time invariable,
i.e., all system components are regarded as ‘‘new’’ after being
repaired. Our future research will focus on time variable sys-
tem in which the performance of components will degrade even
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